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THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF
RCRA: SHOULD STRICT LIABILITY
BE APPLIED TO ITS PERMIT
REQUIREMENT?
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA)1 in response to increased public concern over the
devastating effect of hazardous waste on the environment.' The
statute was designed to provide a "cradle-to-grave" management
scheme for hazardous waste by controlling it from its point of
generation to final disposal.' Regulations issued by the EnvironResource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.) (1982 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter
RCRA].
' See HR. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6239 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1491]. Congress noted
that RCRA was enacted to help solve the "problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of
discarded materials generated each year, and the problems resulted from the anticipated
eight percent annual increase in the volume of such waste." Id. Congress, in the Act itself,
found that without careful planning and management of hazardous waste there is a great
danger to human health and the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 690 1(b)(2) (1982). The postWorld War II economy produced large quantities of hazardous waste which the public
recognized as a major environmental problem prior to the enactment of RCRA. See
ARBUCKLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, at 61 (8th ed. 1985). See generally FINDLEY &
FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1981) (discussing overall public concern regarding environmental ruin).
Congress responded to the environmental outcry with various legislation. For a compendium of federal environmental statutes see IA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(1989 & Supp. June 1989). See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly
referred to as The Clean Water Act of 1977), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp.
1989) (regulating discharge of pollution into waterways); National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. 1989) (establishing national
standards for environmental protection). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626
(1982 & Supp. 1989) (regulating air pollutants). Congress also targeted the hazardous waste
problem directly. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(1988) (regulating use and disposal of toxic materials); The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1982 & Supp. 1989) (regulating cleanup of hazardous waste damage); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1989)
(recognizing breadth of hazardous waste cleanup problem). For a discussion of various
methods of national regulation of hazardous substances see Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18 ENVTL. L. 505-35 (1988).
' See Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 COR-
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to RCRA 4 require a
documentation system through which the EPA can track hazardous waste through generation, transportation, treatment, storage
and eventual disposal.5 RCRA is enforced by the EPA through
both civil and criminal mechanisms. 6
During the 1980s the federal government's effort to prosecute
environmental crimes increased dramatically. This heightened
L. REV. 706, 709 n.24 (1983) (suggesting that "commentators have deemed RCRA
system a 'cradle-to-grave' statutory scheme because subtitle C of the Act traces hazardous
waste from generator, to transporter, to disposal facility."); Note, Landowner Liability Under
CERCLA: Is Innocence A Defense?, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 149, 151 n.l 1 (1988)
(citing 1 D. STEVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE at § 5.01, 5-6
(1988)).
RCRA is designed for the following purposes: 1) to provide a system for tracking
and preserving a record of hazardous waste movement from its inception to disposal
("cradle to grave"); 2) to ensure disposal is accomplished so as to prevent escape of
hazardous waste into the environment; and 3) to provide an enforcement mechanism
to ensure compliance with the regulations.
Id.
See also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984)
("Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 as a 'cradle-to-grave' regulatory scheme for toxic
materials.
...), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). See generally, Rosbe, RCRA and Regulation of Hazardous and Nonhazardous Solid Wastes - Closing the Circle of Environmental Control,
35 Bus. LAW. 1519 (1980) (providing an overview of effect of RCRA's implementation).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6929 (1982 & Supp. 1989), wherein Congress provided the EPA
with regulatory authority.
5 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925 (1982 & Supp. 1989). Generators of hazardous waste must
comply with standards authorized by section 6922, which include preparing a manifest system to track the movement of waste through ultimate disposal. See 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1982
& Supp. 1989). In addition, transporters of waste are required to comply with another set
of regulations dealing with record keeping, labeling, and the delivery of hazardous waste
shipments to designated treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 6923
(1982 & Supp. 1989). Lastly, owners and operators of treatment, storage and disposal facilities are required to obtain proper permits as well as comply with the manifest system. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 6924-6925 (1982 & Supp. 1989). See also S. NovIcK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION § 13.01[5] (1989) (manifest systems used to ensure that hazardous waste sent
only to permitted facilities). See generally ARBUCKLE, supra note 2, at 61 (describing duties of
those involved in the manifest system); Note, HazardousWastes: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REV. 675, 677 n.15 (1981) (describing the operation of a manifest system).
See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. 1989).
See Habicht, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10478, 10479 (Dec. 1987). The
statistical record of indictments and civil proceedings brought by the Justice Department
shows a dramatic increase in enforcement activity beginning in the early 1980s. Id. See also
McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in EnforcingEnvironmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1133, 1141-43 (1986) (discussing variety of factors that
brought about increased emphasis on environmental enforcement and providing summary
of statistical information showing dramatic increase in environmental convictions and
fines); Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10065, 10065-66 (Mar. 1985) (providing statistics that reveal increased enNELL

Criminal Provisions of RCRA
activity in criminal enforcement was prompted by a series of
highly publicized incidents that confirmed the public's belief that
the hazardous waste problem was in urgent need of attention." To
facilitate this effort Congress amended RCRA in 1980,1 and again
in 1984.0 Although the majority of the amendments represented
forcement activity).
s See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y.
1988). Over an eleven year period, more than 21,000 tons of various waste were deposited
in upstate New York's Love Canal area, resulting in a multitude of health problems. Id.
New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (General Electric
disposed of between four and five hundred fifty-five gallon drums containing hazardous
substances in Glenns Falls, New York resulting in extensive damage to land, air, and natural resources). See also Harris, Cavanaugh & Zisk, Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal
Hazardous Waste Law: The Knowledge of Corporationsand Their Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 203, 205-06 (1988) [hereinafter Federal Hazardous Waste Law] (quoting HOUSE SUBCOMMIrEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 31 (Comm.

Print 1979)).
In 1979 Assistant United States Attorney General James Moorman, who was responsible
for enforcing the United States' environmental laws, testified before Congress as to the
seriousness of the hazardous waste problem:
Moorman's testimony reflected the fact that during the late 1970s several highly
publicized incidents galvanized public opinion into a conviction that the threat to
public health was both real and immediate. In the public's mind, places such as the
Chemical Control site in Elizabeth, New Jersey, Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New
York, the so-called Valley of the Drums in Shepardsville, Kentucky, and the Stringfellow Acid Pits in California had become synonymous with - and the symbols of corporate America's reckless disregard of public health.
Id. See generally S. NovIcK, supra note 5, § 13.01[6], at 13-17 (Love Canal prompted EPA
staff to heavily publicize similar environmental disasters in an effort to persuade Congress
to adopt stricter legislation).
' Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)-(d)
(1982 & Supp. 1989)). Comprehensive RCRA regulations were promulgated by the EPA
on May 19, 1980 and became effective on November 19, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33066
(May 19, 1980).
Further evidence of Congress' concern for the environment was revealed by its enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA). See Note, Landowner Liability Under CERCLA: Is Innocence a Defense?, 4 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 149, 152 (1988) (CERCLA enacted in response to "heightened
public consciousness of the harm to human health and environment" unregulated hazardous waste can cause).
10 See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 221, 98
Stat. 3221, 3248-51 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1989)); § 403(b), 98 Stat. 3272
(1984) (authorized Attorney General to deputize EPA employees as special U.S. Marshals
for criminal investigations); § 403(d)(5), 98 Stat. 3272 (1984) (authorized EPA to conduct
investigations under RCRA's criminal enforcement provisions); § 232(a), 98 Stat. 3256
(1984) (expanded criminal liability under § 6928(d)).
Section 6928(d) as amended provides:
Criminal Penalties. Any person who(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under
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minor changes aimed at refining the hazardous waste regulatory
this subchapter, or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052),
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052); or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit;
or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any applicable interim status regulations or standards;
(3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false material statement or
representation in any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, or other
documents filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with regulations
promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an authorized State
program) under this subchapter;
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, exports, or otherwise handles any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste under this subchapter (whether such activity took place before or takes
place after November 8, 1984) and who knowingly destroys, alters, conceals, or fails
to file any record, application, manifest, report, or other document required to be
maintained or filed for purposes of compliance with regulations promulgated by the
Administrator (or by a State in the case of an authorized State program) under this
subchapter;
(5) knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be transported without a
manifest, any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous
waste under this subchapter required by regulations promulgated under this subchapter (or by a State in the case of a State program authorized under this subchapter) to be accompanied by a manifest;
(6) knowingly exports a hazardous waste identified or listed under the subchapter
(A) without the consent of the receiving country or, (B) where there exists an international agreement between the United States and the government of the receiving
country establishing notice, export, and enforcement procedures for the transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes, in a manner which is not
in conformance with such agreement; or
(7) knowingly stores, treats, transports, or causes to be transported, disposes of, or
otherwise handles any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste under
subchapter(A) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a permit
under this subchapter; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any applicable regulations or standards under this subchapter;
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of
violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years (five years in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed
after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment under the respective paragraph shall be doubled with respect to both fine and
imprisonment.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. 1989). See also ARBUCKLE, supra note 2, at 101 ("The
1984 Amendments significantly expand the list of these criminal violations ....
All of this
is part of a message from Congress to EPA and the Justice Department that Congress
wants to see more rigorous enforcement of the nation's hazardous wastes laws."). See generally Roske & Gulley, The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984: A Dramatic Over-
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program, Congress adopted major changes in one area: criminal
enforcement."' Despite the amendments, federal prosecutors have
been unable to effectively enforce RCRA's criminal provisions due
to controversy regarding the requisite mens rea necessary to sustain a conviction.12 Recently, in United States v. Hoflin,'3 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the provisions of RCRA section 6928(d)(2), which imposes criminal penalties upon a person
who engages in certain environmentally unsafe conduct, including
the disposal of hazardous waste without an authorizing permit.
The principal issue in Hoflin concerned the interpretation of the
word "knowingly" as it appears in that section.' 4 The word is undoubtedly a modifier," but the statute does not clearly indicate
which words it modifies."
This Note discusses the requisite mental state for a criminal
haul of the Way America Manages Its Hazardous Wastes, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10458 (1984) (overview of the 1984 amendments' effect of significantly broadening the
scope and complexity of the program).
" See Federal Hazardous Waste Law, supra note 8, at 206. See also supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text. See generally Note, Element Analysis Applied to Environmental Crimes:
What Did They Know and When Did They Know It? 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 53, 54 (1988)
(discussing elements of culpability in environmental criminal provisions).
" See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989) (construed RCRA §
6928(d)(2)(A) to mean knowledge of absence of permit not required), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1143 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(construed "knowingly" modifier to apply to § 6928(d)(2)(A), but required only a knowledge of fact, not law); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-68 (3d
Cir. 1984) (covered personnel subject to criminal prosecution under § 6928(d)(2)(A) only if
they knew or should have known there had been no compliance with the permit requirement), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). Cf Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425
(1985) (statute requires showing that defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by
statute or regulation); United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 63 (1984) ("knowingly" did
not modify all elements of crime). See also Fike, A Mens Rea Analysis for the Criminal Provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 174, 175 (1987) (federal prosecutors hampered by mens rea controversy).
,S 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
" See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (court construed statute to determine whether defendant
must "know" dump site lacked permit).
"' See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 at 212-14 (2d ed. 1986) (effect of
"knowingly" in statutes).
," See Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1502 ("Congress did not provide any guidance, either in
the statute or the legislative history, concerning the meaning of 'knowing' in section
6928(d)."); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 ("As a matter of syntax we find it no more
awkward to read 'knowingly' as applying to the entire sentence than to read it as modifying
only 'treats, stores or disposes.' "); Fike, supra note 12, at 175 (discussing ambiguity of §
6928(d)). Cf W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4(b) at 213-14 (2d ed. 1986) (ambiguity regarding scope of "knowingly" as modifier).
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conviction under RCRA section 6928(d)(2) and suggests an interpretation that imposes strict liability with respect to its permit requirement. Part I reviews the statutory language, the legislative
history, and relevant case law to determine the proper elements of
the crime provided for in section 6928(d)(2). Part II examines the
impact of the Hoflin case as compared to the conclusions drawn
from the analysis in Part I.
I.
A.

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

6928(d)(2)

Statutory Construction

In order to properly construe a statute, its language must first
be examined." RCRA section 6928(d)(2) provides:
[a]ny person who(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous
waste identified or listed under this subchapter (A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to
Title I of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act (86 Stat. 1052)[33 U.S.C. §§ 1411 et seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any applicable interim status regulations or
standards . . .
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more
than $50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment not
to exceed two years ....
It is evident that "knowingly" modifies the words "treats,"
"stores," "disposes of," and "any hazardous waste,"' 9 but what is
1" See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (to determine statute's scope
look to language first); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (statutory interpretation begins with statute's language); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (examine language first; if plain and not leading to
absurd result, it is sole evidence of legislative intent); Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d
525, 529 (9th Cir. 1946) (court may rely on sufficiently clear language). See also R. DICKERSON, THE LANGUAGE AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229-33 (1975); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1975).
IS 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
" See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1033 ("'knowingly' modifies 'hazardous waste' as well as
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not as clear is whether the word "knowingly" also modifies the
permit requirement in subsection (A). 2"
It is a well-settled rule of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
criminal offenses must include a mens rea component.2 1 Congress
may depart from this underlying principle only where the statute
is enacted to protect the public welfare.22 The title, subject matter, and available legislative history of RCRA strongly indicate
that protection of the public welfare is the purpose behind and
goal of RCRA.2" Courts have confirmed this conclusion. 4
.treats, stores and disposes of' "); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669 ("knowingly" applies
to all elements of offenses). Cf Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1503 (knowledge applies to "hazardous waste" only with respect to facts not with respect to law).
',See supra note 12 (case law interpreting whether "knowingly" modifies § 6928
(d)(2)(A)'s permit requirement).
" See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) ("intent
generally remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense"); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 n.14 (1952) (penal system must require mens rea to be accepted
as constitutional); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) ("the existence of a
mens rea is the rule of, rather than exception to, the principle of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence").
" See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)
(Congress may depart from general rule only if to protect public welfare); United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (no element of scienter necessary to convict under Firearm Law); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53 (public welfare offenses "consist only of forbidden
acts and omissions," and therefore require no mental state); United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (no mens rea necessary where statute touches "phases of the
lives and health of people, which in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely
beyond self-protection"). See also Fike, supra note 12, at 177-78 (mens rea analysis of public
welfare offenses); Habicht, supra note 7, at 10483 (public welfare statutes require only
knowledge of law or intent to violate it). But see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
433 (1985) (Court, wary of criminalizing innocent conduct, held knowledge of illegality
necessary). The Liparota Court noted that the particular (Food Stamp Fraud Act) violation
would not threaten the community's health or safety. Id.
" See Title 42 of the United States Code (Public, Health and Welfare title). In the congressional findings section of the statute, Congress stated that the "disposal of solid waste
and hazardous waste in or on the land without careful planning and management can present a danger to human health and the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 690 1(b)(2) (1982). The
legislative history also indicates RCRA is a public welfare statute. See H.R. REP. No. 1491,
supra note 2, at 3. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce sought to protect
the environment and its population through its recognition of the detrimental effect of
improperly discarded hazardous waste. Id.
The Committee also referred to other motivations, such as concern "with the consumption of [the] nation's domestic raw materials and the potential for future material
shortages" as well as increasing lack of available landfill areas at which to dispose of discarded materials. Id.
",See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989) (RCRA is public
welfare statute), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1143 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786
F.2d 1499, 1503 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("section 6928(d)(1) is undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated area with great ramifications for the public health and
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Although it appears that Congress had the authority to create
strict liability offenses in this statute,2 5 it is submitted that a review
of section 6928(d)(2) in the broader context of RCRA's other
criminal provisions supports the argument that strict liability may
not have been what the legislature intended. An examination of
each criminal provision in section 6928 reveals that "knowledge"
is a theme that runs throughout.2 6 Such evidence intimates that
Congress may have intended that "knowingly" modify all of section 6928(d), including the permit requirement in section
6928(d)(2). 2" However, it is more likely that Congress intended to
safety"); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) (concluding that RCRA can be classified as a "public welfare statute"), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985).
"1See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW, § 2.12(d) at 155-56 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing constitutionality of strict liability statutes).
The United States Constitution forbids the federal government (amendment V) and the
states (amendment XIV) from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. Courts have held that offenses requiring
no mens rea must bear some substantial relationship to some matter of legitimate public
concern so as not to offend due process. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959)
("public interest in the purity of its food is so great as to warrant the imposition of the
highest standard of care on distributors - in fact an absolute standard ....");United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (federal narcotics statute required no mens rea due to seriousness of offense); United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir.) (stressing seriousness of
crime court upheld statute prohibiting boarding or attempting to board aircraft with
weapon), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). Cf Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781 (8th Cir.
1925) (court found scienter necessary in statute imposing strict liability on those buying
drugs with forged stamps). But see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (strict
liability provision struck down in apparent public welfare statute).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1989) ("knowingly transports" without permit); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1989) ("knowingly treats . .. in knowing
violation .. .of any applicable interim status regulations .... ); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3)
(1982 & Supp. 1989) (knowingly makes false statement in manifest); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4)
(1982 & Supp. 1989) (knowingly destroys related documents); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(5)
(Supp. 1989) ("knowingly transports without a manifest"); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6) (Supp.
1989) ("knowingly exports a hazardous waste .).
See also supra note 10 (full text of §
6928(d)).
"7 See Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1503-04 (applying strict liability to section 6928(d) could
criminalize innocent conduct, conflicting with congressional intent); Johnson & Towers, 741
F.2d at 668 (court held "knowingly" applies to subsection (A), stating that it was unlikely
that Congress intended to strictly criminalize conduct under subsection (A) while not doing
so under subsection (B)). The Johnson & Towers court concluded that either "the omission
of the word 'knowing' in (A) was inadvertent or that 'knowingly' which introduces subsection (2) applies to subsection (A)." Id. See also Fike, supra note 12, at 179 (arguing for
application of mens rea). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8(a) at
243-46 nn.1-19 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing factors to consider when determining legislative
intent regarding strict liability); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.36 (4th ed.
1984) (discussing use of intrinsic aids in statutory interpretation).

Criminal Provisions of RCRA

create an offense in section 6928(d)(2) that contained a greater
degree of culpability.28 If this were true, and Congress did intend
to omit the mens rea from subsection (A), it could have purposefully formulated language to convey that intent.29 It is submitted
that such an intent is expressed in RCRA section 6928(d)(2); the
language chosen by Congress makes subsection (A) and subsection
(B) critically distinct. While Congress placed a mens rea component in subsection (2), (the language preceding subsections (A)
and (B)),"0 subsection (A) conspicuously omits a knowledge requirement, while in subsection (B) knowledge is unmistakably an
element."'
Notwithstanding this apparent congressional intent to omit a
" See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 144, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
5036. The Committee determined that:
[tihe existing subsection provides criminal penalties for knowingly treating or storing, or disposing of hazardous wastes without a permit, but existing law is unclear
whether a violation of a permit condition constitutes a criminal violation. The proposed section as amended would eliminate the ambiguity by providing explicit penalties for knowingly failing to comply with a material condition of the permit.
This section is intended to prevent abuses of the permit system by those who obtain and then knowingly disregard them. It is not aimed at punishing minor or technical variations from permit regulations or conditions if the facility operator is acting responsibly. The Department of Justice has exercised its prosecutorial discretion
responsibly under similar provisions in other statutes and the conferees assume that.
. .similar care will be used in deciding when a particular permit violation may warrant criminal prosecution of this Act.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Federal Hazardous Waste Law, supra note 8, at 214 n.70 (noting that different degrees of criminal intent may be required for different elements of a
particular offense); Fike, supra note 12, at 186 (suggesting that Congress may have intended violations under subsection (B) to be held to different level of intent than subsection (A)).
9 Cf Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985) (absent precision in drafting, statute must contain mens rea); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499,
1504 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (if Congress had intended strict liability, it would have dropped
"knowingly" requirement).
",See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1989). "Any person who . . . knowingly
treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter.
. .. Id. (emphasis added).
" 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1989). "Any person who .. .knowingly treats,
stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter ... (B)
in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit .......
Id.
(emphasis added). See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989) (to read
statute otherwise would "eviscerate the distinction" between subsection (A) and subsection
(B)). But see United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) ("as
a matter of syntax we find it no more awkward to read 'knowingly' as applying to the
entire sentence than to read it as modifying only 'treats, stores and disposes' "),cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1208 (1985).
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
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mens rea requirement from subsection (A), some have argued that
subsection (2)'s "knowingly" runs through the statute and accordingly affects offenses defined in both subsections (A) and (B)."2
While such a reading may comport with certain canons of statutory interpretation,"3 other such canons present a contrary view. 8 '
To allow the word "knowingly" in subsection (2) to run through
and modify the terms of subsections (A) and (B) would render the
"knowingly" modifier present in subsection (B) redundant. 5 It is
submitted that such a strained reading was not the interpretation
intended by Congress.
It is arguable that RCRA's language is clear enough to support
an interpretation based on its plain meaning."' Nevertheless, it is
prudent to examine RCRA's legislative history for congressional
87
perspective.
" See Opening Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 25-27, United States v. Hoflin, 880
F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990) [hereinafter
Brief for Defendant]. See also Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1504 (knowledge requirement runs
throughout the statutory section); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (same).
13 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 27, § 59.04, at 13. In general, criminal statutes
are construed so as to require criminal intent, especially when the offense is a felony. Id. See also
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 n.6 (1980) (congressional omission of mens rea
does not mean punishment can be imposed without proof of mens rea); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952) (crime construed as containing mens rea, although
not contained in statutory language).
" See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984). No rule of grammar requires that
this term be applied to every subsequent phrase in the section. Id. at 69 n.6. See United
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1955). "That criminal statutes are to be construed strictly is a proposition which calls for the citation of no authority. But this does not
mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete
disregard of the purpose of the legislature." Id. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2(a) at 75 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing use of canons in construing criminal
statutes).
" See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. The Hoflin court's interpretation of subsection (A) is
consistent with the fundamental principle of statutory construction that "a statute should
not be interpreted so as to render the legislature's language mere surplusage." In Re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 1988). See also 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1984) (same).
" See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037 (court concluded statute not ambiguous and accordingly
applied plain meaning to its language). The plain meaning rule has been stated as:
"[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See generally W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2(b) at 76 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing plain meaning rule).
" See STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 76 (2d ed. 1984). The context of
statutory language includes the purpose the legislature had in passing the statute, its legislative history, the relationship of the statute to other statutes, etc. Id. To obtain this context, one must obviously go "outside" the four corners of the statute. Id. See also Frank-

Criminal Provisions of RCRA
B.

Legislative History

The primary concern of Congress when enacting RCRA in
1976 was to effectively address the mounting threat to the Ameri-

can public and the environment created by improper waste disposal practices.

8

Due to the gravity of this problem Congress

deemed it necessary to provide criminal as well as civil sanctions.3 9
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to impose
criminal penalties on only the most serious offenses."0 It has been
argued that "knowing" violations are the most severe and therefore are the only offenses that Congress intended to criminalize."1

Although this argument may be applicable to the majority of the
furter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 535-38 (1947)
(discussing ambiguity of words and necessity to look beyond them).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 3. The House Report states:
The overriding concern of the Committee however, is the effect on the population
and the environment of the disposal of discarded hazardous wastes - those which by
virtue of their composition or longevity are harmful, toxic or lethal. Unless neutralized or otherwise properly managed in their disposal, hazardous wastes present a
clear danger to the health and safety of the population and to the quality of the
environment.
Id. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing RCRA's purposes).
"' See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 30 ("Many times civil penalties are more
appropriate and more effective than criminal. However, many times when there is a willful
violation of a statute which seriously harms human health, criminal penalties may be appropriate."). See also Habicht, supra note 7, at 10485 (Justice Department poll revealed that
Americans view environmental crime resulting in death as seventh most severe crime,
ahead of skyjacking and drug smuggling); Riesel, supra note 7, at 10072 (suggesting criminal sanctions are especially necessary in corporate crime because imprisonment and social
stigma serve as deterrents to corporate officers).
", See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 30 (report suggests that only willful violations
which seriously affect human health are to be penalized); Fike, supra note 12, at 189-90
(evidence in legislative history indicates RCRA's criminal sanctions primarily apply to
"most egregious of offenders").
" See Brief for Defendant at 29. Hoflin claimed that due to the broad range of enforcement provisions contained in RCRA, prosecutors should tailor the penalty to the crime. Id.
Thus, only the most serious violations (those where knowledge is an element) were to be
criminally prosecuted. Id. See also United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504
(11 th Cir. 1986) (congressional purpose indicates knowledge of permit status required; removing knowing requirement would criminalize innocent conduct); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) (unlikely Congress intended to prosecute persons acting without permit irrespective of their knowledge), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985). Cf United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987). The
Endangered Species Act provided criminal penalties when a violation of the Act was done
"knowingly." Id. Although the court found that Congress did "not intend to make knowledge of the law an element" of its criminal violation, defendants contended that knowledge
was a necessary element of a criminal penalty. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9453, 9476).
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criminal provisions contained in RCRA, the importance of the
permit requirement indicates that this argument is inapplicable
here."' Since the primary purpose of the statute is to deter unpermitted dumping of hazardous waste, 4 it would therefore be reasonable for Congress to deem this statute's cardinal prohibition a
serious offense and accordingly criminalize such conduct under a
strict liability standard."
The legislative history also indicates a trend toward the
strengthening of RCRA's penalty provisions and criminal enforcement mechanisms.'5 This is evidenced by the 1980 and 1984
amendments to RCRA."' The 1980 amendment increased en"' See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing importance of permit requirement), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). Those who handle certain hazardous wastes have an affirmative duty to provide information to the EPA in order
to secure permits. Id. "Placing this burden on those handling hazardous waste materials
makes it possible for the EPA to know who is handling hazardous waste, monitor their
activities and enforce compliance with the statute." Id.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1982 & Supp. 1989). Section 6902(a) notes that the objectives
of the statute "are to promote the protection of health and the environment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources ....
Id. It continues by listing eleven means
by which to achieve this end. Id. All of the means focus on various ways to halt illegal
dumping and include financing, education, research, and "prohibiting future open dumping on the land." Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (Supp. 1989). In 1984 Congress amended the
statute to declare the national policy on hazardous waste: "wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste
that is . . . generated should be . . . disposed of so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health .... " Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(4) (1982) ("open dumping is
particularly harmful to health, contaminates drinking water from underground and surface
supplies, and pollutes the air and the land"); 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1982 & Supp. 1989)
(after regulations take effect "disposal of any such hazardous waste is prohibited except in
accordance with such a permit").
"" See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39 (stressing importance of permit requirement, court
held "that knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element of the offense defined
by 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(2)(A)"); Cf Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
Despite the general requirement of a mens rea in criminal law, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a different standard applies to criminal statutes that are designed to protect public welfare and those that are regulatory in nature. Id. With regard to violations of
these types of statutes the Court stated, "whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is
the same . . . . [Liegislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not
specify intent as a necessary element." Id. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (public welfare statute containing "knowingly" construed as requiring no
requisite mental state). But see United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668
(3d Cir. 1984) (court recognized general rule regarding public welfare statutes but refused
to apply such construction to RCRA), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
4' See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing the 1980 and 1984 amendments' broadening of enforcement devices).
46 See supra notes 9-10 (discussing the 1980 and 1984 amendments to RCRA).

Criminal Provisions of RCRA
forcement power by creating felony sanctions for first offenders, 7
as well as increasing the maximum civil penalties available.48 It
further increased the federal prosecutors' arsenal by creating the
offense of knowing endangerment.49 The 1984 amendments" furthered this enforcement trend by repealing the "extreme indifference" and "unjustified disregard" elements of the "knowing endangerment" provision. 5 The accompanying Senate and House
Reports indicate that the underlying purpose in enacting the 1984
amendments was to encourage federal prosecutors to initiate
criminal actions under this section.5 2 RCRA's enactment and subsequent amendments evidence Congress' intent to strengthen the
power of federal prosecutors in the area of hazardous waste law
enforcement.5 Accordingly, it is submitted that an interpretation
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. 1989). The 1980 changes imposed felony sanctions on "[ajny person who knowingly transports . . . waste ... to a facility which does not
have a permit . . ." and on any person who "knowingly ... disposes of ... waste without
having obtained a permit." Id. (emphasis added). See also Federal Hazardous Waste Law,
supra note 8, at 207 (1980 amendment significant because it established first felony sanctions for federal environmental crime).
"s See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. 1989) (1980 amendment increased maximum
civil penalty from $25,000 to $50,000).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1982 & Supp. 1989). The enactment prohibited "[any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, [or] disposes of . . . any hazardous waste"
from knowingly placing another person in "imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury." Id. See Federal Hazardous Waste Law, supra note 8, at 207. The "knowing endangerment" offense became the first of its kind in federal law; its enactment reflects the legislature's objective of "providing prosecutors with enforcement authority adequate to address the more egregious instances of improper waste disposal .
Id.
, See supra note 10 (discussing 1984 amendments).
s' See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(2)(A), (B) (1982 & Supp. 1989). Prior to the 1984 amendments, the "knowing endangerment" provision required the elements of either "an unjustified and inexcusable disregard for human life, or . . . an extreme indifference for human
life" to be proven for conviction. d. These provisions placed such a heavy burden of proof
on the government that only one indictment was handed down before the amendments. See
United States v. Greer, 655 F.2d 51, 52-54 (5th Cir. 1981) (employees directed to test
deadly chemicals by sniffing them, rather than conducting appropriate tests as specified by
RCRA). See also Federal Hazardous Waste Law, supra note 8, at 213 ("reluctance of federal
prosecutors to initiate criminal actions" under "knowing endangerment" provision led to
repeal of "extreme indifference" and "unjustified disregard" elements).
"2See H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1983). The House Report
indicates that Congress felt these elements had made the crime too difficult to prosecute,
causing the "knowing endangerment" provision to be "unnecessarily restrictive." Id. The
Senate Report indicates that these provisions ("extreme indifference" and "unjustifiable
disregard") had caused much confusion thus making the statute "unduly restrictive." See S.
REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5607.
"' Cf. Fike, supra note 12, at 191. This commentator suggests that due to the extreme
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that achieves this worthwhile end would be appropriate; not requiring proof of knowledge for successful prosecution of offenses
connected with RCRA's permit requirement will facilitate this desired result.
Additional evidence of the legislative intent surfaced during the
1980 amendment process." Commentary by the House Conference Committee on the "knowing endangerment" provision contained in the 1980 amendments reveals to a greater extent the
sentiments of Congress." Its commentary contained the following
observations concerning section 6928: "The state of mind for all
criminal violations under section [6928] is 'knowing.' The conferees have not sought to define 'knowing' for offenses under subsection (d); that process has been left to the courts under general
principles."" 6 Congress chose not to elaborate on the mens rea issue and did not further address these "general principles. ' 57 In
construing RCRA, the courts are in agreement that the most important "general principle" is the well-established proposition that
the criminal provisions of statutes that are designed to protect the
public health are to be construed so as to effectuate their regulatory purpose. 8 In order to achieve the regulatory purpose of this
importance Congress placed on "stopping the illicit disposal of hazardous wastes, one may
assume that Congress's intent was to maximize, not minimize, the deterrent effect of
RCRA's criminal provisions." Id.
See supra note 9 (discussion of 1980 amendment).
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5036. The Report deals specifically with subsection (f) which
defines the mens rea necessary for conviction under the newly added "knowing endangerment" provision. Id. See also infra note 56 and accompanying text.
" See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5036. The Report continues "[s]ince subsection (e) creates an
entirely new offense, however, the conference substitute defines specifically the nature and
quality of the knowledge that must be proved." Id.
67 Id.

" See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1986) (reviewing long list of cases to determine "general principles" and construing statute to best
effectuate regulatory purpose); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662,
666 (3d Cir. 1984) (relying on precedents court held regulatory statutes are to be construed to effectuate regulatory purpose), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). Cf United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975) (upheld penal sanctions cast in rigorous terms
when seen fit to enforce accountability of corporate agents dealing with products that may
affect health of customers); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (construed
firearm statute to include no mens rea because statute was "regulatory measure in the interest of public safety"); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952) (construed
public welfare statute to have no mens rea to maximize its deterrent effect). But see
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statute, a construction that maximizes its deterrent effect would
be appropriate." Consequently, reading a mens rea element into
subsection (d)(2)(A) would contravene legislative intent by making
the offense more difficult to prosecute.
C.

Precedent

When interpreting section 6928(d), courts have been plagued
by the troublesome statutory language as well as the lack of statutory guidance.6" The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in United
States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc., 61 was the first appellate court to
62
address these issues.
The Johnson & Towers corporation and two of its employees
were charged with dumping chemicals into a trench that flowed
into a tributary of the Delaware River.6" The corporation pleaded
guilty, but the individual defendants moved for dismissal of the
RCRA counts, contending that since they were not "owners or
operators" of the corporation they were not subject to the statute. 4 The motion was granted and the government appealed. 6 '
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1985) (public welfare statute construed to
avoid conviction of those unaware of law).
89 Cf Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (construed firearm statute to omit mens rea, which maximized deterrent effect); United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 565 (1971) (construed hazardous waste statute to allow prosecutor to presume defendant was aware of regulation, which maximizes deterrent effect). But cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at
433. Liparota construed a regulatory statute in such a way so as not to maximize deterrent
effect by requiring a culpable mental state. Id. The Court distinguished the statute in
Liparota from those in Freed and InternationalMinerals & Chem. Corp. by noting that it did
not involve "a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent
public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health or safety." Id.
" See Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1502 ("Congress did not provide any guidance either in
the statute or the legislative history, concerning the meaning of 'knowing' in section
6928(d)."); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (concluding language of section
6928(d)(2)(A) is ambiguous). But see United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir.
1989) (concluding statute is unambiguous).
" 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
, See Brief for Appellee at 18, United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989)
(No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990) [herinafter Brief for Appellee].
"' Johnson & Tower, 741 F.2d at 664. These industrial chemicals contained methylene
chloride and trichlorethylene which are classified as "hazardous wastes" under RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. 1989). Id. Counts 2, 3 and 4 alleged violations under
RCRA criminal provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. 1989). Id.
" Id. Jack Hopkins, a foreman, and Peter Angel, servicing manager in the trucking department, were the two remaining defendants employed by Johnson & Towers, Inc. Id.
IId. at 665. The single issue on appeal was whether the individual defendants were
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In reversing,6 6 Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's construction of the statute as creating "an unduly narrow view of
both the statutory language and the congressional intent" and
held that the two defendants were "persons" within the meaning
of the statute.6" In dicta, the Johnson & Towers court then interpreted what proof of knowledge, under section 6928(d)(2), would
be necessary for conviction at trial.6 8 The Third Circuit, while
noting that the regulatory purpose of the statute provides a reasonable basis for reading the statute with no mens rea requirement, nevertheless held that "such a reading would be arbitrary
and nonsensical when applied to this statute."6 9 The court reasoned that it was unlikely that Congress intended to strictly
criminalize conduct under subsection (A), while not doing so
under subsection (B). 7 0 It concluded that either Congress inadvertently omitted a mens rea element from subsection (A), or that the
mens rea requirement from subsection (2) ran through and modified subsection (A). 7 ' Accordingly, the Johnson & Towers court
held that the statute required a showing of knowledge for every
7 2
element of the offense.
Although the Johnson & Towers analysis may appear reasonable,
when viewed in light of the statute's legislative history, its conclusubject to prosecution under RCRA's criminal provisions. Id.
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.
e Id. at 667. The Johnson & Towers court concluded that RCRA was a public welfare
statute, and consequently construed the statute so as not to "limit the class of potential
defendants." Id.
" Id. at 667-69.
69 Id. at 668.
70 Id. The court reasoned that "it is unlikely that Congress could have intended to subject to criminal prosecution those persons who acted when no permit had been obtained
irrespective of their knowledge (under subsection (A)), but not those persons who acted in
violation of the terms of the permit unless that action was knowing (subsection (B))." Id.
But see supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between subsection (A)
and subsection (B)).
" Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. The court relied on United States v. Marvin, 687
F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983), which construed a
food stamp statute so as to have its mens rea run through the statute. Id.
72 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669. The court noted that this holding should not place
an undue burden on federal prosecutors because the doctrine of "inferred knowledge"
applies to these crimes. Id. This doctrine when applied to these types of cases, provides that
"where obnoxious wastes are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be
aware of the regulation." InternationalMinerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 569.
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sion is flawed.7" As previously noted, it is unlikely that Congress
accidentally omitted mens rea language from section 6928(d)(2)."'
To the contrary, strict compliance with the permit requirement is
necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose.7 This strongly indicates that Congress intentionally omitted this knowledge modifier
in order to promote enforcement, and ultimately, compliance.7"
With this in mind, it is unlikely that theJohnson & Towers decision
will be given much precedential weight.7
Section 6928 was again construed in United States v. Hayes International Corp.7 8 In Hayes International, the corporation and one of
its employees were convicted of charges based on their consignment of leftover jet fuel, paint, and solvents to an unpermitted
recycling firm.7 9 The trial court set aside the guilty verdict on several grounds, one of which was that the defendants had no knowledge that the recycling firm to which they consigned their waste
did not possess the requisite permit. 8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,8 1 articulating
that in an industry as heavily regulated as that of hazardous waste
management, ignorance of the law is no defense.8 2 The Hayes Internationalcourt stated that it would also be no defense to claim a
lack of knowledge that the substance was a "hazardous waste"
" See supra note 52 and accompanying text (evidence that Congress intended to promote federal enforcement); notes 53-58 and accompanying text (arguing that to effectuate
regulatory purpose, courts should construe regulatory statute to maximize deterrent
effect).
" See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing apparent congressional intent
to omit mens rea requirement from subsection (A)).
" See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing importance of permit
requirement).
76 Id.

See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (court declined to follow Johnson & Towers). See also Fike,
supra note 12, at 185-87 (discussing weakness of Johnson & Towers analysis).
7 786 F.2d 1499 (1 ith Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1500. Hayes International Corp. operated an airplane refurbishing plant. Id.
Performance Advantage, the recycling firm, paid Hayes 20 cents per gallon for left over jet
fuel, which they recycled, and at no extra cost removed the paint and solvents. Id.
80 Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1501. The other grounds were: (1) the defendants did not
commit any "knowing" violation because they misunderstood the regulations, and (2) the
defendants did not commit a "knowing" violation because they believed Performance Advantage was recycling wastes. Id.
I' at 1507.
Id.
82 Id. at 1503. The Hayes Int'l court construed the statute as a public welfare statute. Id.
See also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing public welfare statutes).
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within the meaning of the regulations," nor would it be a defense
to argue ignorance of the permit requirement. 8 '
Although the Eleventh Circuit held that a party may be convicted without awareness of the regulation, it concurrently determined that in order to convict a defendant, the prosecutor must
prove that the defendant knew the facility with which it was dealing had no permit. 85 The court recognized this paradox, but reasoned that to hold otherwise might criminalize innocent conduct.8" Judge Kravitch, writing for the court, concluded that such
a standard does not place an excessive burden on federal prosecu87
tors who could readily prove this knowledge circumstantially.
The Hayes Internationalcourt chose not to impose a strict liability standard on subsection (A) due to a fear that a contrary rule
might punish the innocent.8 8 Such apprehension is unwarranted
because this is a risk Congress chose to take.8 9 Congress imposed
this high standard of liability in an effort to induce those handling
hazardous waste to ascertain the truth.9" Accordingly, it is suggested that an interpretation imposing this affirmative duty on
those handling toxic waste would more effectively realize the intent of Congress.
In sum, Johnson & Towers and Hayes International both recog88 Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1503. Distinguishing Liparota, the court concluded that knowledge of the illegality is not an element of the crime. Id.
" Id.
8" Id. at 1505. The Hayes Int'l court asserted that the government does not face an unac-

ceptable burden of proof in showing that the defendant acted with knowledge of permit
status because the court allowed the prosecutor to prove this knowledge circumstantially.
Id. In addition, the court also recognized the doctrine of "willful disregard." Id.
" Id. at 1504 n.6. The court stated that "it might seem anomalous to hold that the
defendant had actual knowledge that the law requires a permit, but that it must show
knowledge of the permit status of the disposal site at issue." Id. The court feared someone
might be tricked into believing a facility had a permit, deliver material to them, and be
punished for this mistake of fact. See id. But see Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (placing burden on
handlers of waste would better effectuate legislative purpose); supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing importance of permit requirement).
87 Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1505. See supra note 84.
See supra note 86.
88 Cf Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (construing language according to legislative intent, despite warnings expressed in Hayes Int'l concerning mistake of fact).
" See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 ("those who handle wastes are affirmatively required to
provide information to the EPA in order to secure permits."); 42 U.S.C. § 6925(b) (1982)
(requirements of permit application).
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nized the need for strict compliance with RCRA provisions, 9 yet
each, in construing the permit requirement to include a mens rea
element, fell short of giving the prosecutor the necessary enforcement power. Nevertheless, both decisions have increased the
power of the federal prosecutor by adding to his arsenal the doctrines of "inferred knowledge," "conscious avoidance," and "presumed knowledge." 9 Such an enforcement trend, if continued,
would lead to a construction of this public welfare statute in a way
that fulfills its legislative objective."
II.

THE

Hoflin CASE

Recently, in United States v. Hoflin,94 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals construed RCRA section 6928(d)(2). Douglas Hoflin, as
Director of Public Works for the city of Ocean Shores, Washington, instructed one of his employees to haul old drums that held
surplus flammable traffic paint to the city sewage treatment plant
and bury them.9" Following these instructions, Hoflin's employee
buried fourteen drums at the plant.9 Testimony revealed that
during the burial process, several drums were leaking and at least
one broke open.97 Almost two years later, the incident was re91 See Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1503 ("statute is undeniably . . .public welfare statute
involving . .. heavily regulated area with great ramifications for . . . public health and
safety."); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666 (noting that although result is harsh, this public welfare statute must be construed to effectuate its regulatory purpose).
9" See Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1504 ("inferred knowledge" and "conscious avoidance");
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669 ("presumed knowledge"); Federal Hazardous Waste Law,
supra note 8, at 236 (discussing these doctrines as applied to Johnson & Towers and Hayes
Int'l).
"' See Federal Hazardous Waste Law, supra note 8, at 236 (suggesting that Hayes Int'l and
Johnson & Towers have created a trend toward enhanced enforcement power and should
their progeny continue this trend, legislative intent will be realized); Fike, supra note 12, at
197. The author states that "the criminal provisions of RCRA have been correctly interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit in Hayes Int'l and should be interpreted by other courts as
establishing a general intent offense" as is indicated by the legislative history of the Act. Id.
880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
9 Id. at 1035. The director of the sewage treatment plant, Fred Carey, urged Hoflin not
to bury the paint there because he felt it would jeopardize the plant's National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) certification, but Hoflin proceeded anyway. See
Brief for Appellee at 9.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035.
Id. The hole was not deep enough, so the employees crushed the barrels with a frontend loader to make them fit. See Brief for Appellee at 9-10.
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ported to authorities.9 8 The EPA recovered the drums, which
were discovered to have contained material deemed hazardous
under'RCRA,99 thereby requiring disposal only at facilities holding EPA permits. 10 0 No such permit had been obtained by the city
sewage treatment plant. 1 Consequently, Hoflin was indicted and
convicted of disposing of hazardous waste without a permit, in violation of RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A). 0 2
On appeal, the defendant contended that he did not know the
city lacked the required permit. 0 This argument compelled the
Ninth Circuit to construe section 6928(d)(2)(A) to determine
whether knowledge of the lack of a permit is an essential element
of the crime. 0 4
The Hoflin court began its analysis by interpreting the language
of the statute.'0 5 It concluded, contrary to the Johnson & Towers
court, that the language is unambiguous, and accordingly construed its plain meaning. 0 8 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held
that knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element under
section 6928(d)(2)(A).' 0 1 Judge Thompson, writing for the court,
reasoned that such a result is consistent with the purpose of
RCRA, which is to protect the public and the environment from
the grave dangers associated with unregulated hazardous waste
disposal.'0 8 Moreover, the court maintained that this decision was
" Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035. The director of the sewage treatment plant finally reported
the incident. Id.
"' Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. 1989) (discussing criteria for identifying and
listing hazardous waste).
100 Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035.
101 Id.
Id. at 1036. Hoflin was also indicted for conspiracy to dispose of a hazardous waste
10
without a permit, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, from which he was
acquitted, and on an unrelated offense of disposing of kitchen sludge in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2 and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), under which he was convicted. Id.
10
Hoftin, 880 F.2d at 1036. Hoflin unsuccessfully argued that knowledge of the permit
was an element of the offense and that the failure to so instruct the jury was reversible
error. Id.
Id. at 1037.
1
101 Id. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing proper method of statutory

interpretation).
100 See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037 (statute unambiguous so no need to look beyond plain
meaning of language); but see Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (statute ambiguous so must
look beyond words to determine meaning).
...Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037.
10
See id. at 1038. "Millions of tons of hazardous substances are literally dumped on the

Criminal Provisions of RCRA
in accord with other decisions that have construed similar public
welfare statutes. 109 Finally, the Hoflin court concluded that the
placement of this burden on those who handle hazardous waste
will allow the EPA to better enforce compliance, thus effectuating
RCRA's legislative purpose. 1 0
In accord with Part I's analysis, the Hoflin court adopted a strict
liability standard with respect to RCRA's permit requirement
under section 6928(d)(2)(A)."' It is suggested that this approach
correctly interprets the statute's language and fulfills the legislature's intent.
CONCLUSION

Despite the inherent difficulty in construing inexact statutory
language coupled with insufficient legislative history, this Note has
suggested that RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A) has been correctly interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Hoflin. The language of the statute, when viewed after an examination of its legislative history,
strongly indicates that strict liability with respect to its permit requirement was intended. Historically, courts have attempted to
construe public welfare statutes so as to comport with congressional objectives of strict enforcement. The determination in Hoflin that RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A) requires no mens rea will
maximize the desired deterrent effect of this statute, thereby conforming with congressional intent and society's concern.
James S. Lynch

ground each year; a good deal of these can blind, cripple or kill." Id. (citing 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6238, 6241, 6249). See also supra note 2 and accompanying text
(discussing purpose of RCRA).
109 Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing
RCRA as public welfare statute).
110 Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. "Finally, our conclusion is consistent with RCRA's goals
and the treatment Congress gave 'knowledge' in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) and (B) to
achieve these goals." Id.
111 Id.
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